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I. INTRODUCTION
When two groups of people have claims to the same piece of land,
conflict is likely to ensue. For the Israelis and the Palestinians, the
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conflict over a piece of land around the size of the state of New Jer-
sey has created one of the longest standing conflicts in modern
times.' While the United States has attempted to mediate peace
discussions between the two groups for decades, Israelis and Pales-
tinians continue to feud over the small piece of land.2 Energized by
the resentment hat Israel occupies Palestinian land, the Palestin-
ians devised an international campaign that encourages individu-
als and companies to put economic and political pressure on Israel.3
These pressures take the form of boycotts, divestments, and sanc-
tions, which inspired the movement's name (the "BDS Move-
ment").4
In order to protect and stand by Israel, several states have en-
acted anti-BDS laws that sanction any company that supports the
BDS Movement by boycotting Israel.5 Subsequently, the federal
government also implemented legislation to shield Israel from the
dangers of boycotts.6 While state anti-BDS legislation is rooted in
strong public policy to protect the states' economies and to protect
the nation's alliance with Israel,7 the anti-BDS laws raise constitu-
tional issues. Since the state anti-BDS laws take a stand on foreign
relations, and foreign policy is typically within the federal govern-
ment's authority and not within the states' authority,8 the state
anti-BDS laws raise three constitutional issues: (1) whether they
impede on the federal government's exclusive power to conduct for-
eign policy,9 (2) whether they violate the dormant Foreign
1. See Max Singer, What the Fight in Israel is All About, SIMPLETOREMEMBER (Nov. 8,
2002), http://www.simpletoremember.com/articles/a/what-the-fight-in-israel-is-all-about/.
2. See generally The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, STATE: HISTORY,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo [hereinafter Oslo Accords] (last updated
2016).
3. Intro to BDS, BDS MOVEMENT, https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds [hereinafter In-
tro to BDS] (last updated 2017).
4. Id.
5. See generally Yonah Jeremy Bob, How US States are Countering the BDS Movement
Against Israel, JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-
And-Diplomacy/The-success-story-of-US-state-legislatures-steadily-hammering-away-at-
BDS-470233.
6. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 205, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452 (West
2016).
7. See Rubio Commends Florida Legislature for Passing Law Targeting Anti-Israeli
Boycotts, SENATE: RUBIO (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/in-
dex.cfm/press-releases?ID=E67F5281-3B91-4A0C-ADD5-FE3B626EF200.
8. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
9. "Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively." Michael John Garcia & Todd Garvey, State and Local Economic
Sanctions: Constitutional Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 5 (2013) (quoting U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 232 (1942)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Commerce Clause,10 and (3) whether they are preempted by federal
law." While this article examines the aforementioned constitu-
tional issues, anti-BDS laws raise First Amendment challenges, as
well. 12
Even though states have implemented laws similar to the anti-
BDS laws at various times throughout the past three decades to
take a stand on foreign issues, there is surprisingly little case law
addressing their constitutionality.1 3 When determining whether
the anti-BDS laws are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the
United States (the "SCOTUS") would likely look to the limited num-
ber of lower court cases that analyze other state sanctions, and its
own narrow authority on the preempted state sanction.14
Due to the complex nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is
unlikely that the states are permitted to take a stand on the dispute
by implementing anti-BDS laws.15 Specifically, state anti-BDS
laws likely interfere with the president's ability to conduct diplo-
macy between the Israelis and Palestinians.16 In addition, since the
anti-BDS laws discriminate against foreign commerce, the state
10. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Even when Congress is silent, the Commerce Clause
is interpreted to "invalidate state laws that inappropriately interfere with interstate or for-
eign commerce," which is known as the dormant Commerce Clause. Joel P. Trachtman, Non-
actor States in U.S. Foreign Relations?: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 350, 354 (1998).
11. Preemption is defined as: "the principal (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a
federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation." Preemption,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. In January of 2018, a federal judge in Kansas issued an injunction halting the en-
forcement of the state's anti-BDS law by opining that the law violates First Amendment
freedoms to participate in boycotts. US: Kansas Judge Temporarily Suspends Anti-BDS
Law, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/kansas-judge-
temporarily-suspends-anti-bds-law- 180130181725634.html; see also First Amendment-Po-
litical Boycotts-South Carolina Disqualifies Companies Supporting BDS From Receiving
State Contracts.-S.C. Code Ann. § 11-35-5300 (2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2031 (2016)
[hereinafter Political Boycotts].
13. See Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 563, 565 (1993). Few fed-
eral courts have reviewed state sanctions and determined that they were unconstitutional,
while one state court ruled that a local sanction was constitutional; additionally, the
SCOTUS ruled that a state sanction was preempted by federal law but skirted the issues of
whether the state sanction interfered with the federal government's authority to conduct
foreign affairs and whether it violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375-77 (2000); Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 750 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Bd. ofTrs. of the Emps.'
Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 757 (Md. 1989).
14. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 733; Bd. of Trs. of
the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 720.
15. See generally Singer, supra note 1.
16. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
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anti-BDS laws likely violate Congress' foreign commerce power.1 7
However, since the federal government also isolates companies that
boycott Israel, it is unlikely that the state anti-BDS laws are
preempted by existing federal legislation.18 Moreover, the SCOTUS
should thoroughly analyze state anti-BDS laws to finally determine
whether states are permitted to take a stand on foreign affairs in
the form of economic sanctions.
II. BACKGROUND
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an intricate dispute over the
same land.19 Currently, the conflict is centered around the West
Bank, since the Palestinians want the region for their own state,
but Israelis continue to construct settlements on the land.20 As a
result of the land dispute, the Palestinians launched an interna-
tional campaign, known as the BDS Movement, to encourage boy-
cotts against Israel.21
The United States responded to the BDS Movement and enacted
laws to counteract it.22 Designed after popular anti-apartheid laws
in the 1980s,2 3 the state anti-BDS laws support Israel by withdraw-
ing state money from companies that support the BDS Movement.24
To support the states in their endeavor, the Senate introduced a bill
attempting to denounce the potential constitutional challenges to
17. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979).
18. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 205, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(c) (West
2016).
19. Damon Linker, Sorry, There Is No Solution to the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, WEEK
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/448116/sorry-there-no-solution-israelipalestinian-
conflict.
20. See Cal Perry & Ayman Mohyeldin, Israeli Settlements Controversy Explained-and
Why It Matters, NBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2016, 10:50 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-settlements-controversy-explained-why-it-mat-
ters-n700761.
21. Peter Tatchell, Israel Sanctions: BDS Is the Gandhian Non-Violent Strategy to End
Palestine Occupation, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/israel-sanc-
tions-bds-gandhian-non-violent-strategy-end-palestine-occupation- 1527331.
22. See generally Bob, supra note 5.
23. As a reaction to South Africa's racially discriminatory political system, known as the
apartheid, over 140 state and local governments enacted sanctions against South Africa.
Fenton, supra note 13, at 564. While each state and local law varied, generally, these anti-
apartheid laws prohibited investments in companies doing business with South Africa. Id.
at 568. After the federal government passed its own sanctions against South Africa, one
state court examined whether a local anti-apartheid law was constitutionally valid and ulti-
mately determined that the local sanction was constitutional. See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'
Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 720.
24. See Yolanda Rondon, New Jersey Is Pushing Unconstitutional Anti-BDS Legislation
Because No More Plausible Deniability, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2016, 3:13 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yolanda-rondon/new-jersey-is-pushing-unc_b_9502288.html.
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state anti-BDS laws.2 5 Further, the federal government passed a
separate act, intended to protect trade, which also punishes compa-
nies who boycott Israel.26
A. Overview of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest standing con-
flicts in modern times.27 Centered around two groups of people with
competing claims to the same land, the conflict is nothing short of
complex.28 Land disputes are at the heart of this tumultuous his-
tory.29 Israeli and Palestinian officials have negotiated over land
disputes intermittently throughout their history in the hopes of
achieving peace.30 The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been at
the center of the conflict's land dispute, since both groups have
claims to these regions.31 In 2005, Israel permanently withdrew
from the Gaza Strip as a step to achieving peace with the Palestin-
ians.32 The Israeli settlements in the West Bank, however, remain
at the forefront of the conflict.33
The Israeli settlements in the West Bank are controversial be-
cause many political leaders believe Israeli settlements are pre-
venting the Israelis and Palestinians from reaching a peace agree-
ment.34 Due to clashing ideas as to how land should be divided, the
25. See Combating BDS Act of 2017, S. 170, 115th Cong. (2017).
26. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(c)
(West 2016).
27. See Bobbette Deborah Abraham, From Mandate to Mineshaft: The Long Rocky Road
to the Modern State of Israel, 5 REGENT J. INT'L L. 123, 172 (2007) (noting that "the fight for
possession of Israel's inheritance" began when Israel proclaimed independence in 1948 and
still "continues to this day").
28. Linker, supra note 19. Some believe that there is no solution to the conflict at all,
due to the demands from each side. Id. These thoughts are the consequences of Israel's and
Palestinian leaders' demands: Israel wanting Palestinian recognition of the Jewish state and
Palestinians wanting the Palestinian "right of return." Id. Commentators believe these de-
mands cannot coexist unless both sides are willing to compromise. Id.
29. See Singer, supra note 1.
30. See generally Mitchell G. Bard, Israel-Palestinian Negotiations: History & Overview,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-is-
rael-palestinian-negotiations (last visited 2017).
31. See generally id. Jerusalem is also heavily fought over in this dispute. Id.
32. Daniel Byman, Israel's Gaza Withdrawal 10 Years Later: More Successful Than You
Think, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Aug. 13, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/israels-gaza-
withdrawal-more-successful-than-you-think/.
33. See Josef Federman, Israel Government Approves 3,000 New Settler Homes, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 5:30 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/israel-media-
army-orders-residents-west-bank-outpost-45161919.
34. Carlo Munoz, John Kerry, Benjamin Netanyahu Clash Angrily About Peace, WASH.




Israeli-Palestinian conflict polarizes the world.35 Often at the fore-
front of the United Nations, various tactics have been used to at-
tempt to settle the dispute.36 Recently, the world ignited in a fierce
debate regarding the Israeli settlements in the West Bank after the
United Nations (the "UN") passed a resolution condemning Israeli
settlements.37 The UN resolution caused such a controversy be-
cause the United States did not veto the vote to condemn Israeli
settlements in the West Bank.38
Dating back to Israel's independence in 1948, the United States
has remained a present figure in the journey to achieve peace be-
tween the Israelis and Palestinians.39 Specifically, United States
presidents have held and mediated peace discussions with Israeli
and Palestinian leaders.40 President Bill Clinton, one of the most
involved presidents in the conflict, held and mediated serious dis-
cussions between Israeli and Palestinian officials throughout his
presidency; however, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders failed to
reach a compromise.41 Since then, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
has remained at the top of each president's diplomatic goals.42 Un-
derstanding the intricacies of the conflict, each current president
handles the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with care in the hopes of fi-
nally bringing peace to the Middle East.4 3
35. See generally Rami G. Khouri, How the World's View of the Palestine-Israel Conflict
Is Changing Dramatically, ALTERNET (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/grayzone-pro-
ject/how-worlds-view-palestine-israel-conflict-changing-dramatically.
36. See generally Phyllis Bennis, What Has Been the Role of the UN in the Israel-Pales-
tine Struggle?, TRANS ARAB RESEARCH INST. (Jan. 2001), http://tari.org/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=15. The UN played a role in Israel's inde-
pendence and maintained its presence throughout disagreements between Israelis and Pal-
estinians. Id.
37. See S.C. Res. 2334 (Dec. 23, 2016); see generally Guy Milliere, Obama's Betrayal of
Israel, GATESTONE INST. (Jan. 13, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.gatestoneinsti-
tute.org/9755/obama-betrayal-israel.
38. See Milliere, supra note 37. While the Obama administration viewed the resolution
as a feasible answer to achieve peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, Israel viewed
the United States' actions as betrayal. See id.
39. See generally Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: 1948-2008, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBRARY (Apr. 2009), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-studies-an-anthol-
ogy-the-u-s-and-israel.
40. See, e.g., Oslo Accords, supra note 2 (detailing the Clinton administration's efforts in
the 1990s to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations).
41. Id. President Clinton held a summit at Camp David with Israeli and Palestinian
leaders after a hostile period between the two groups. Id.
42. See generally Ben-Zvi, supra note 39. President Obama conducted iplomacy in the
hopes of achieving peace between the Israelis and Palestinians; additionally, within his first
days in office, President Trump is already making strides to influence the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Ian Fisher, Trump Presidency Is Already Altering Israeli-Palestinian Politics, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/world/middleeast/israel-benja-
min-netanyahu-jerusalem-maale-adumim-donald-trump.html?_r=O.
43. See generally Fisher, supra note 42.
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B. What is the BDS Movement?
Palestinians launched an international campaign in July of 2005
to put economic pressure on the state of Israel in the form of boy-
cotts, divestments, and sanctions, or "BDS."4 4 The movement was
created to pressure Israel into vacating territories highly disputed
between the Israelis and the Palestinians, particularly the West
Bank settlements.4 5 To achieve this goal, the BDS Movement en-
courages entities to withdraw their investments from companies
that support Israel.46 The movement also encourages people to boy-
cott Israeli products, Israeli professionals, Israeli professional asso-
ciations, Israeli academic institutions, and Israeli artistic perfor-
mances. 47 Ultimately, the campaign urges people, organizations,
churches, academic associations, and unions to join their movement
to pressure Israel "to comply with international law." 4 8
Since the BDS Movement encourages companies to economically
boycott Israel, lawmakers recognize the BDS Movement as a threat
to Israel's existence.4 9 The alliance between the United States and
Israel is an important relationship that affects the citizens of both
nations immensely.50 For example, the United States entered into
its first ever free trade agreement on April 22, 1985 - and this
agreement was with Israel.5 1 Trade between the two countries has
expanded immensely over the three decades this agreement has
stood, reaching approximately $40 billion each year.5 2 In order to
sustain the strong economic relationship between the United States
and Israel, the United States began to counteract the effects of the
BDS Movement.5 3
44. Political Boycotts, supra note 12, at 2031.
45. Tatchell, supra note 21. The BDS Movement's goals also include dismantling the
wall separating Israeli and Palestinian territories, non-discrimination of Palestinians, and
the right to return for all Palestinians that vacated after Israel's independence. Id.




48. See Intro to BDS, supra note 3.
49. See Aaron Menenberg, Israel Gives Much More to the U.S. Economy Than You Imag-




52. Id. Aside from trade, the United States and Israel also expand their research to-
gether in the most important aspects of their citizens' lives: healthcare, agriculture, national
security, and technology. Id.
53. See 4 Things You Should Know About the Bipartisan BDS Bill, AJC: GLOBAL JEWISH





Realizing the threats that the BDS Movement posed on Israel,
states and the federal government sought o protect their ally
through anti-BDS legislation.5 4 The state and federal anti-BDS
laws were designed after legislation enacted in the late 1980s which
penalized companies doing business in South Africa as a way to dis-
approve of South Africa's apartheid regime.55 State and local gov-
ernments had also previously implemented sanctions modeled after
the anti-apartheid laws to target countries such as Burma, China,
Cuba, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Switzerland in the late 1990s.5 6 Gen-
erally, such state and local laws are enacted in response to political
or human rights problems within foreign countries, in the hopes of
changing the countries' behavior.5 7
State and local sanctions are most often in the form of divestment
and procurement laws.58 Procurement laws are selective purchas-
ing laws that forbid the state from contracting with, or purchasing
goods and services from, any entity that does business with the tar-
geted country.59 Divestment laws are selective investment laws
that forbid state or local agencies from investing state funds in com-
panies that do business with the targeted country.60 Both forms of
sanctions "attempt to force companies to choose between doing busi-
ness with the state or local government or doing business in the
target country."61 Since the term "sanctions" accurately describes
state and local legislation directed at foreign nations, the term is
used throughout this article when referring to either type of these
laws. 62
1. State Anti-BDS Legislation
In order to negate the effects of the BDS Movement, state legis-
latures enacted laws to prevent the boycotts against Israel.6 3 South
54. See generally Bob, supra note 5.
55. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of
State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a
Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 307 (1999).
56. Id. at 308.
57. Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 1.
58. See id.
59. Id. See Peter J. Spiro, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action As an Intrusion Upon
the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 821 (1986). These restrictions pre-
vent government purchases of goods and services from entities that do business with the
targeted nation. Id.
60. See Spiro, supra note 59, at 819-20.
61. Denning & McCall, supra note 55, at 311.
62. Sanction, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
63. Bob, supra note 5.
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Carolina and Illinois led this effort by proposing legislation to coun-
teract the BDS Movement as early as June 2015.64 As of July 2017,
North Carolina became the twenty-second state to enact anti-BSD
legislation.6 5 Generally, the anti-BDS laws are state sanctions that
divest state assets from corporations, entities, and non-profits that
boycott Israel by refusing to conduct business with Israel or declin-
ing to purchase goods and services from Israel; however, each
state's anti-BDS law is slightly different.6 6 Some of the state anti-
BDS laws prohibit state pension funds from investing in companies
that participate in the boycotts against Israel, while other anti-BDS
laws prohibit the state from entering into contracts with companies
that fall within those criteria.6 7
2. Federal Anti-BDS Legislation
After multiple states passed their specific anti-BDS laws, the
Senate introduced a bipartisan bill supporting the states known as
the "Combating BDS Act of 2017."68 The bill expressly states that
Congress supports the states divesting state assets from entities
that participate in economic boycotts targeting Israel.69 This bill
64. Id.
65. North Carolina Becomes 22nd US State to Pass Anti-BDS Legislation, UNITED WITH
ISRAEL (July 2, 2017), https://unitedwithisrael.org/north-carolina-becomes-22nd-us-state-to-
pass-anti-bds-legislation/. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-393.02 (West 2016); CAL. PUB.
CONT. CODE § 2844 (West 2016); COLO. CODE REGS. § 24-54.8-202 (West 2016); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 215.4725 (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-85 (West 2016); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/1-110.16 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12J.2 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.14
(West 2016); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.157 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.76
(West 2016); 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3602 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-
5300 (West 2015).
66. See Reuters, Ohio Anti-BDS Law Signed by Former Presidential Candidate Kasich,
JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Ohio-anti-BDS-
bill-singed-into-law-by-former-White-House-candidate-Kasich-475968. South Carolina's law
is broader than most, in that it does not even mention Israel by name. Bob, supra note 5. As
described by South Carolina state senator Alan Clemmons, the law "prohibits those who en-
gage against trade based on national origin, against our allies and against the state of South
Carolina." Id. The companies that fall within that criterion are prohibited from receiving
state contracts. Id. On the other hand, California's anti-BDS law requires every company
receiving a state contract over $100,000 to declare, under penalty of perjury, that they do not
have anti-Israel policies. California State Assembly Unanimously Passes Bill Against Israel
Boycotts, TOWER (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:27 PM), http://www.thetower.org/california-state-assem-
bly-unanimously-passes-bill-against-israel-boycotts/print/.
67. Political Boycotts, supra note 12, at 2031.
68. See Combating BDS Act of 2017, S. 170, 115th Cong. (2017). This bill updates a
similar bill proposed in 2016. Rubio, Manchin Introduce Bill to Counter BDS Movement Tar-
geting Israel, SENATE: RUBIO (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/in-
dex.cfm/press-releases?id=B88174F9-4DBC-4AC5-A2ED-A6142C864219 [hereinafter Rubio,
Manchin].
69. Combating BDS Act of 2017, S. 170 § 2, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill states that
states may divest from companies that partake in commerce related boycotts against Israel,
if there is credible information available about he companies' actions. Id. § 2(a)(1).
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attempts to shield the state laws from future legal challenges by
granting congressional approval.70 The policy behind the Combat-
ing BDS Act is to protect the United States' and Israel's shared eco-
nomic and security interests.7 1
The federal government also passed the "Trade Facilitation and
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015" (the "Trade Act") in February of
2016.72 To promote United States trade, the act, like the state anti-
BDS laws, requires the United States to isolate companies that par-
ticipate in the boycotts against Israel.73 The federal act protects
Israel as well as all "Israeli-controlled territories."7 4 The Trade
Act's inclusion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank potentially
poses a challenge for the president o conduct diplomacy over the
land dispute.7 5 Realizing this potential risk, President Barack
Obama included a signing statement to the Trade Act which ex-
pressed his disapproval of the act's inclusion of the "Israeli-con-
trolled territories."7 6 President Obama said this provision of the act
was "contrary to longstanding bipartisan United States policy, in-
cluding with regard to the treatment of settlements [J""7 though, ul-
timately, President Obama said he would enforce the bill, so long
as it did not interfere with diplomacy.7 8 Notably, many state anti-
BDS laws include protection of Israeli settlements.79
70. Id. § 2(d). The bill expressly states that the state anti-BDS laws are not preempted.
Id.
71. Rubio, Manchin, supra note 68. Senator Manchin stated, "Israel has been our strong-
est ally in the Middle East and we need to send them a strong signal that we will do every-
thing in our power to fight the BDS [M]ovement." Id.
72. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452 (West
2016).
73. Id. § 4452(b)(3). The bill mandates that a report must be submitted of all politically
motivated boycotts against Israel. Id. § 4452(d)(1). After the report is submitted, the United
States must take "specific steps" to discourage the boycotts against Israel. Id. § 4452(d)(2)(B).
74. See § 4452(d)(2)(A).
75. See Ron Kampeas, Obama Weighs in on BDS Settlement Fight- But Battle Likely
Won't End There, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Poli-
tics-And-Diplomacy/Obama-weighs-in-on-BDS-settlement-fight-but-battle-likely-wont-end-
there-446184.
76. Id. Presidential signing statements are used when the president signs the bill but
wants to include a short document to express his concerns with the bill, to explain it, or even
to praise it. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Exec-
utive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006). While presidential signing statements
may express the president's disapproval on a particular bill, the president signed the bill into
law; therefore, "no executive statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either
validity or effect." DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. Kampeas, supra note 75.





The states are taking a position on foreign policy when they enact
anti-BDS laws by using their buying power to influence the views
of companies in order to challenge the BDS Movement.80 Since the
states have little, if any, authority in foreign relations, anti-BDS
laws raise constitutional issues.81 First, the state anti-BDS laws
may intrude upon the federal government's power to conduct for-
eign affairs.82 Second, the state anti-BDS laws may violate the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.83 Finally, an existing federal
law may preempt the state anti-BDS laws.8 4
Intruding into the federal government's authority to conduct for-
eign affairs, violating the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, and
preemption by existing federal legislation are three separate and
distinct constitutional issues.85 In other words, if a state statute
violates one of the doctrines, this does not necessarily mean the
statute also violates the other two doctrines.8 6 While courts may
focus on one constitutional challenge and skirt the other two issues,
state sanctions raise all three challenges.8 7
A. Intrusion into Foreign Affairs
The federal government possesses uperior power to conduct the
nation's foreign relations.8 8 As a result, state laws containing for-
eign policy elements may be unconstitutional if the state law hin-
ders the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs.89
Commonly referred to as the one-voice doctrine, the SCOTUS main-
tains that the United States must be able to speak with one voice
80. See Fenton, supra note 13, at 564; Whit Cox, Constitutional Implications of Califor-
nia's Anti-BDS Legislation, AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE (Feb. 3,
2016), http://www.adc.org/2016/02/the-constitutional-implications-of-californias-anti-bds-
legislation/.
81. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
82. See Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 5.
83. See id. at 2.
84. See id. at 6.
85. Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Gara-
mendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 747 (Apr. 2017).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 765-66. For example, the SCOTUS in Crosby only analyzed whether the
state sanction against Burma was preempted by federal law, even though the state statute
also likely violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and intruded into the federal gov-
ernment's authority to conduct foreign affairs. Id.; see generally Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
88. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62
(1941).
89. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 429 (1968).
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when dealing with foreign nations.90 This idea has played a role in
restricting the states from conducting foreign affairs.91 The two pri-
mary SCOTUS cases that control the issue of whether state laws
relating to foreign policy are permissible or impermissible are Clark
v. Allen and Zschernig v. Miller.92
In the 1947 opinion of Clark v. Allen, the SCOTUS analyzed the
constitutionality of a California statute which held that nonresident
aliens could only inherit property from residents of California if
Americans could also inherit personal property in the alien's home
country.93 The Court analyzed whether California intruded into the
realm of foreign affairs by enacting the statute.94 Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas opined that local law controls the rights
of succession of property.95 The Court determined that so long as
state legislation does not conflict with treaties and do not enter into
the "forbidden domain" of negotiating with a foreign country, legis-
lation pertaining to rights of succession would be constitutional.96
The Court determined that California did not enter "the forbidden
domain of negotiating with a foreign county or making a compact
with it contrary to the prohibition of Article I, Section 10 of the Con-
stitution."97 Thus, the SCOTUS concluded that the statute was con-
stitutional by stating, "[w]hat California has done will have some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line." 98
90. David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954-55 (2014).
91. Id. at 959. When it comes to "national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power"; that "in respect of our foreign rela-
tions generally, state lines disappear... [and] the State... does not exist." Id. at 959-60 (quot-
ing U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)). Further, the "[p]ower over external affairs is
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." Id. at 960
(quoting U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233).
92. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744 (Md. 1989);
see generally Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429; Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 503 (1947).
93. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 744-45 (citing Clark, 331 U.S. at 516-
17). After a California resident left her entire estate to German citizens, "the California
Attorney General vested himself in all right, titled, and interest to the estate." Kevin P.
Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Leg-
islation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 510 (1987).
94. Clark, 331 U.S. at 517.
95. Id. The California statute was challenged based on preemption but the Court deter-
mined that the Treaty of 1923 with Germany did not preempt the statute. Lewis, supra note
93, at 510.
96. Lewis, supra note 93, at 510.
97. Clark, 331 U.S. at 517. (internal citations omitted) (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936)); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution places limitations on states such as entering into treaties with foreign countries
and issuing money. Id.
98. Clark, 331 U.S. at 517.
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Twenty-one years after the Clark opinion, the SCOTUS overruled
a similar Oregon statute in Zschernig v. Miller.99 The statute at
issue in Zschernig, like the California statute in Clark, restricted
inheritance by aliens if Americans did not have reciprocal rights to
inherit in the alien's home country; however, the Oregon statute in
Zschernig also prohibited the alien's home country from confiscat-
ing any of the inheritance received from their American heir.100
Again writing for the majority, Justice Douglas analyzed whether
the Oregon statute intruded into the federal government's author-
ity to conduct foreign affairs.101 This time, the SCOTUS determined
that the state intruded into matters of foreign affairs, which the
"constitution entrusts to [the] President and Congress."102 Unlike
the California statute in Clark, the Court found the Oregon law in
question had more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign
nations.103 Further, the Court opined that, while states tradition-
ally regulate the distributions of estates, the regulations need to be
submissive if they impair the Nation's foreign policy power.10 4 The
Court determined that state laws are forbidden if they have "a di-
rect impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the
power of the central government to deal with those problems."105
The difference between the statute in Clark and the statute in
Zschernig was that the statute in Zschernig mandated that the for-
eign heirs "receive the benefit, use or control of money or property
from estates of persons dying in this state without confiscation, in
whole or in part, by the governments of such foreign countries."106
This provision required Oregon judges to examine how foreign law
protected rights and how Oregon law protected rights.107 The Ma-
jority felt uncomfortable with that provision, stating, the "statute
as construed seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of na-
tions established on a more authoritarian basis than our own."108
Thus, the Court determined that Oregon was in effect conducting
its own foreign policy review by enacting this statute and found that
the statute had a direct impact on foreign affairs. 109
99. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 745; see Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429.
100. Trachtman, supra note 10, at 357; see Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
101. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 434-35.
104. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 746 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440).
105. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
106. Lewis, supra note 93, at 510 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440).
109. Lewis, supra note 93, at 511.
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Ultimately, the SCOTUS in Zschernig determined that state stat-
utes that may disrupt the federal government from conducting di-
plomacy are unconstitutional.110 The Court determined that the
Oregon statute provided "great potential" to disrupt the federal gov-
ernment's foreign relations or could cause an embarrassment for
the nation as a whole.' Further, the SCOTUS found that, by dis-
rupting foreign relations, the statute could cause great interna-
tional controversy.112
B. Violation of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States.. "113 Although the Commerce Clause
is an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the SCOTUS has con-
sistently held that Congress has the authority to control anything
pertaining to commerce, even when Congress does not explicitly act,
which is known as the dormant Commerce Clause1 1 4 Although the
scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is abstract since it is not
expressly stated in the Constitution, the SCOTUS applies the
dormant Commerce Clause when a state discriminates or burdens
interstate commerce.115 When a state discriminates against inter-
state commerce facially or purposefully, the Court will apply strict
scrutiny.116 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the state must show
that there is a legitimate state purpose in enacting the legislation
and an absence of non-discriminatory alternatives; however, since
this test is difficult to survive, the discriminatory state laws are
considered per se invalid.117 Conversely, non-discriminatory laws
that indirectly burden interstate commerce are analyzed under a
110. Alexandria R. Strauss, Supremacy of the Supremacy Clause: A Garamendi-Based
Framework for Assessing State Law That Intersects with U.S. Foreign Policy, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 417, 427 (Oct. 2014).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 427-28.
113. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 749 (Md. 1989) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
114. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995).
115. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Trachtman, supra note
10.
116. Will Sears, Full-Impact Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 157, 163 (2014). Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, discrimination
means "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits
the former and burdens the latter." Id. (quoting Or. Waste Sys. V. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of
Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
117. Id. at 164.
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balancing test and have a better likelihood of survival.118 Such laws
will be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce exces-
sively outweighs the local benefits.119
The primary exception to the dormant Commerce Clause is
known as the market participant exception.120 When a state or local
government acts as a seller or a buyer, rather than acting within its
distinctive governmental capacity, the Commerce Clause does not
limit the state's activities.121 In other words, if the state or local
government is acting as a market participant rather than a market
regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause does not affect the actions
of the state.122
After the dormant Commerce Clause was established, the Court
extended the same principals to state actions that discriminate or
burden foreign commerce, known as the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause.123 Further, the Court added additional requirements
to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause - the state legislation
may not increase the risk of double taxation or hinder the federal
government from conducting foreign affairs.124 Since state action
affecting foreign affairs can cause retaliation from foreign nations,
the Court requires a closer analysis when foreign commerce is in-
volved, rather than just applying an interstate dormant Commerce
Clause analysis when affirmative congressional approval is ab-
sent.125
118. Id. at 165. The balancing test is applied when "the statute regulates even-handedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental." Id. (quoting Pike, 387 U.S. at 142).
119. Id. at 166 (citing Pike, 387 U.S. at 142).
120. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Wilson, supra note 85, at 753. The Court has held that various activities conducted
by the state are shielded from Commerce Clause scrutiny since their activities fall into the
realm of the market participant exception. See Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the Market
Participation Exception, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 647, 647 (1994). See, e.g., White v. Massachu-
setts Council of Const. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 204 (1983) (opining that an executive order
by the Mayor requiring all construction projects funded by the city hire at least half of the
workers from city residents was protected under the market participant exception of the
dormant Commerce Clause); Reeves, Inc. v, Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (finding South
Dakota was a market participant when it sold its surplus of cement from a state-operated
plant to out-of-state companies); Chance Mgmt., Inc. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1108
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that commerce clause restrictions do not apply to a South Dakota
statute prohibiting video lottery machine licenses for corporations that South Dakota resi-
dents do not hold a majority stake in because South Dakota acted as a market participant in
the lottery industry).
124. Wilson, supra note 85, at 753. The primary purpose of the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause is to protect against foreign nations retaliating based on the state legislation.
Id.
125. Id.; Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 3.
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Japan, Ltd. v. Los Angeles was the first SCOTUS case applying
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, and it laid out the require-
ments for the states to avoid constitutional scrutiny under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.126 The SCOTUS determined
that when analyzing Congress' commerce power with foreign na-
tions, rather than "purely interstate commerce," a "more extensive
constitutional inquiry is required."127 The Court ruled that a more
stringent inquiry is required in cases involving foreign commerce
for two reasons.128 First, there is a heightened risk of multiple tax-
ation upon goods involved in foreign commerce than goods involved
in domestic commerce.129 Second, the state "may impair federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."1 3 0
Namely, there is a strong need for the federal government to "speak
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments."13 1 When a state acts as a participant in foreign af-
fairs there is a good chance that foreign nations will correlate the
state's action with the whole nation.132
While the SCOTUS has recognized the market participant excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause for decades, it has yet to de-
termine whether the market participant exception extends to for-
eign commerce.133 Lower courts have expressed their skepticism
and even their refusal to apply the market participant exception to
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.134 For example, the First
Circuit in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios stated that it
is more important for the nation to speak with a unified voice when
it comes to foreign affairs than to extend the market participant
exception to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.135 After
Natsios, the District Court of Puerto Rico in Antilles Cement Corp.
v. Calderon, explicitly opined that the market participant exception
does not apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.136
126. Wilson, supra note 85, at 753.




131. Id. at 755 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
132. J.T. Hutchens, The Market-Participant Exception and the Dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 445, 450 (2007).
133. Id. at 446.
134. See id. at 460.
135. Id. (quoting Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Further, the First Circuit opined that the risk of "retaliation against the nation as a whole"
was greater than the state's interest in enjoying the market participant exception. Id. (quot-
ing Natsios, 181 F.3d at 66).
136. Id. (citing Antilles Cement Corp. v. Calderon, 288 F. Supp. 2d 187, 196 (D.P.R. 2003),
vacated on other grounds in part, 408 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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Relying on Natsios and Japan Line, the district court ruled, "the
risks of foreign commerce are too great to allow the extension of the
market participant exception."137
C. Preemption By Existing Federal Law
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution de-
clares that federal statutes, treaties, and the Constitution are the
"supreme Law of the Land."138 Accordingly, states can be restricted
from taking action in certain fields if federal law controls.139 Con-
gress controls the extent to which the states are preempted by fed-
eral law in any given area.140 Congress may clearly and expressly
preempt state laws or an act of Congress can impliedly preempt
state law.1 4 1 If federal law does not expressly preempt state law, a
court is permitted to infer Congress' intent to preempt state law in
at least two circumstances: (1) state law is preempted when Con-
gress intends for federal law to "occupy the field," 142 and (2) even if
Congress does not intend for federal law to occupy the field, state
law is naturally preempted to the "extent of any conflict with a fed-
eral statute."143
Since it does not take much searching to determine whether Con-
gress expressly preempted state laws or whether state laws actively
conflict with federal law, field preemption is the most ambiguous
form of preemption.144 Courts are tasked with determining whether
Congress left any room in the subject of the legislation for state leg-
islation.145 First, the court starts with a presumption against
preemption, especially in areas traditionally regulated by the
137. Id. (citing Antilles Cement Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 197).
138. Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6; see U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
139. Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6.
140. Id. "A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to
preempt state law." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); see U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
141. Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
142. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. Otherwise known as "field preemption," which means the
federal regulation is "so pervasive that one can reasonably infer that states or localities have
no role to play." Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6. Courts will rule that state laws are
preempted when they can reasonably infer that Congress "left no room" for state laws in that
particular field. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (citing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
143. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941)). Oth-
erwise known as "conflict preemption," which means it is physically impossible to comply
with both federal and state laws. Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6.
144. See Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese Dic-





state.1 46 Beyond that, however, there is "no single method conclu-
sively" to determine whether Congress intended to preempt state
laws.1 4 7 Nevertheless, the SCOTUS has opined that when foreign
affairs are at issue, "concurrent state power that may exist is re-
stricted to its narrowest of limits." 1 48
IV. NOTABLE SANCTION CASES
There is limited case law on the topic of state economic sanctions.
A few lower court cases have determined that state economic sanc-
tions are unconstitutional.1 4 9 The SCOTUS denied granting certio-
rari in the only case to determine that a state economic sanction
was constitutional.15 0 The SCOTUS did, however, analyze one state
sanction and determined that it was unconstitutional because fed-
eral law preempted it.151
A. Board of Trustees of Employees'Retirement System v. Balti-
more
In July of 1986, the city of Baltimore enacted ordinances requir-
ing city pension funds to divest funds from companies doing busi-
ness with South Africa. 15 2 In December of that same year, the Trus-
tees of city employee pension funds and two employee beneficiaries
filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore asking
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to declare the divestment ordi-
nances invalid.1 5 3 The Trustees argued that the ordinances were
preempted by the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, the city ordinances intruded on the federal government's
power to conduct foreign affairs, and that the ordinances violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.1 54 Overall,
the trial court upheld the ordinances and the Trustees appealed to
the Maryland Court of Appeals,15 5 which ultimately held that
146. Id.
147. Id. at 383.
148. Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 68).
149. See generally Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2012);
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
150. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 720 (Md.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
151. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000).
152. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 724.
153. Id. at 725.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 720.
Vol. 56216
State Anti-BDS Laws
Baltimore's divestment law was constitutional.15 6 Notably, the case
was appealed to the SCOTUS, which denied certiorari.157
When analyzing whether the ordinances were preempted by the
federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Art of 1986, the Maryland
Court of Appeals had to analyze the congressional intent behind the
act because the act did not expressly preempt state law.15 8 The
Maryland Court of Appeals opined that even though the Supremacy
Clause states that federal law is the supreme law, in order to pro-
tect the sovereign states, preemption is not easily presumed.159
When it comes to areas where states traditionally regulate, there is
a "strong presumption against finding federal preemption."1 6 0
When preemption is questioned in areas where state and local gov-
ernments traditionally regulate there must be compelling evidence
regarding the congressional intent to preempt.161
The Maryland Court of Appeals determined that regulating the
investments of its employees' pension funds is obviously a field in
which local governments traditionally regulate.162 Since regulating
investments is a traditional duty of state and local governments,
there was a strong presumption that the state ordinances were not
preempted by federal law. 1 63 The Maryland Court of Appeals found
that the evidence to prove that Congress intended to preempt the
states was completely lacking, and therefore, the state ordinances
were constitutional.16 4
The Maryland Court of Appeals applied both Clark and Zschernig
when it analyzed whether the ordinances intruded into the federal
government's authority to conduct foreign affairs.165 The court de-
termined that the ordinances were beyond the scope of Zschernig,
and thus, were constitutional.166 Also, since the effect of the ordi-
nances on South Africa were "minimal and indirect," the ordinances
156. Id.
157. Fenton, supra note 13, at 565 n.4.
158. Bd. of Trs. ofthe Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 741.
159. Id. (citing California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)).
160. Id. (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)).
161. Id. (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 742-43.
165. Id. at 744; see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 517 (1947).
166. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989); see
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (holding that state laws impermissibly intrude on the federal
government's authority to conduct foreign affairs if the state laws have a direct impact on
foreign relations and could prevent the federal government from conducting diplomacy).
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were valid under Clark.167 The Maryland Court of Appeals deter-
mined that "[w]hen a state sells its stock in a corporation doing
business in South Africa, it has no immediate effect on foreign rela-
tions between South Africa and the United States."168
The Trustees also argued that the ordinances violated the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because the ordinances improp-
erly played a role in interstate and foreign commerce.169 The City
responded to the Trustees' dormant Commerce Clause argument by
stating that the ordinances did not fall within the realm of the
dormant Commerce Clause because of the market participant ex-
ception.170 Ultimately, the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with
the City and determined that Baltimore was acting as a market
participant under the ordinances; therefore, the ordinances requir-
ing the city pension funds to divest in companies doing business
with South Africa were outside of the limitations of the dormant
Commerce Clause.171
The SCOTUS, however, has never held whether the market par-
ticipant exception applies to actions affecting foreign commerce.172
When foreign commerce is affected, a more stringent constitutional
inquiry must ensue.173 The Maryland Court of Appeals found that,
while the Baltimore ordinances affected foreign commerce, the mar-
ket exception of the dormant Commerce Clause still protected it
from constitutional challenges.174
B. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
In 1996, Massachusetts enacted a law that prohibited state enti-
ties from purchasing products and services from companies that did
business with the country then known as Burma, now Myanmar.175
Three months after the Massachusetts law was enacted, Congress
passed legislation placing sanctions on Burma.176  The issue
167. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 746-47; see Clark, 331 U.S. at 517
(opining that state legislation that only has some incidental or indirect effect on foreign coun-
tries does not intrude into the federal government's authority to conduct foreign affairs).
168. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 747 (quoting State and Municipal
Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionality
of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985)).
169. Id. at 749.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 752.
172. Id. (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980)).
173. Id. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979)).
174. Id. at 753.
175. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000).
176. Id. at 369; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act of 1997 § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (enacted by the Omnibus
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examined in this case was whether Massachusetts' Burma law was
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.177
In April of 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council (the "Coun-
cil"), a nonprofit corporation that represented multiple companies
affected by the Burma law filed suit against he state officials who
administered the Burma law (the "State").178 The Council argued
that Massachusetts' law infringed upon federal foreign affairs
power, disrupted the Foreign Commerce Clause, and was
preempted by federal legislation.179 The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts determined that the Burma
law "unconstitutionally impinge[d] on the federal government's ex-
clusive authority to regulate foreign affairs."180 Upon appeal, the
First Circuit affirmed on three independent grounds: (1) the act was
unconstitutional because it interfered with the federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs power under Zschernig,181 (2) the act violated
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution,1 82 and
(3) the act was preempted by the federal Burma act.183 The case
was then appealed to the SCOTUS.184
While the circuit court examined the three constitutional chal-
lenges to the state economic sanctions, the SCOTUS only analyzed
the preemption issue regarding the Massachusetts Burma Act.185
The main analysis conducted by the SCOTUS in the Crosby case
was whether Massachusetts' Burma law was preempted by the fed-
eral act sanctioning Burma.186 Ultimately, the Court determined
that Massachusetts' Burma Act was preempted by the intended
purpose of the federal act, which was to grant the president control
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121
to 3009-172 (1996)).
177. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1997 § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (enacted by the Om-
nibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-
121 to 3009-172 (1996)).
178. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370-71.
179. Id. at 371.
180. Id. (quoting Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.
1998)).
181. Id. at 372 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 429 (1968)).
182. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
183. Id. at 371; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act of 1997 § 570.
184. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371.
185. See generally id. at 370-71; see Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,
45 (1st Cir. 1999).
186. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1997 § 570.
Summer 2018 219
Duquesne Law Review
of the economic sanctions on Burma.187 During the Court's analysis
of preemption it stressed that when Congress expressly or impliedly
delegates authority to the president on a particular matter, his au-
thority is great because it encompasses the power he was already
granted under the Constitution plus the powers that Congress del-
egated.188 The Court found that it is implausible for Congress to
both delegate a particular power to the president and want the
states to intrude on the power and compromise its effectiveness.1 8 9
The Court also determined that Massachusetts' act undermined
the president's authority to speak for the whole nation with one
voice in regards to foreign affairs.190 The Court cited to one of the
president's enumerated powers: "[the president] shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea-
ties" and "shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls."191 The SCOTUS determined that Massachusetts' act sab-
otaged the powers of the president o conduct diplomacy,192 and con-
cluded that the state act hindered the president's authority to
"speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other govern-
ments."193
The State argued that Congress never expressly preempted the
state from acting; therefore, the State contended that implied per-
mission was present.194 The State elaborated by asserting that Con-
gress refused to ultimately determine whether states can enact leg-
islation that places sanctions on other state and local govern-
ments.195 Specifically, the State argued that none of the various
state and local economic sanctions against South Africa in the
1980s were preempted by the federal act.196 In the end, the State
asked the SCOTUS to conclude that because of Congress' continued
silence on state sanctions targeting foreign nations, Congress in-
tended to grant implied approval - especially because Congress has
in fact expressly preempted state sanction laws before.197 However,
187. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 § 570.
188. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375.
189. Id. at 376.
190. Id. at 381.
191. Id. at 381 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 386-87.
195. Id. at 387.
196. Id.; see, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744-49
(Md. 1989) (holding that a state sanction against South Africa was not preempted by the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986).




the Court stated that the State's argument of implied approval was
"unconvincing."19 8  It noted that Congress' lack of expressed
preemption essentially means nothing because courts can then ap-
ply the implied preemption doctrine.199 Additionally, the Suprem-
acy Clause does not rely upon expressed congressional approval.200
Further, the Court dismissed the State's argument that the state
sanctions against South Africa were not preempted by noting that
the SCOTUS never determined whether or not Massachusetts'
South Africa laws were preempted or even valid.201
C. National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias
On June 25, 2005, after the government of Sudan committed var-
ious atrocities against individuals in the country's Darfur region,
Illinois adopted an act to put economic pressure on Sudan in the
form of state sanctions.202 The Illinois Sudan Act had two main
prongs.20 3 First, the act amended the Deposit of State Moneys Act
by requiring the state treasury to divest state funds from commer-
cial instruments of Sudan and any company that did business with
Sudan.204 Second, the Illinois Sudan Act amended the Illinois Pen-
sion Act to prohibit retirement funds from investing in any company
that did business with Sudan.205 The National Foreign Trade Coun-
cil (the "NFTC"), eight Illinois municipal pension funds, and eight
beneficiaries of public pension funds brought suit against the Treas-
urer of Illinois, the Attorney General of Illinois, and the Secretary
of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regula-
tion.206 The plaintiffs challenged the act on the grounds that it was
preempted by federal law, interfered with the federal government's
authority to conduct foreign affairs, and violated the Foreign Com-
merce Clause.207
198. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387.
199. Id. at 387-88.
200. Id. at 388.
201. Id.
202. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (N.D. Ill.
2007); Elizabeth Trachy, State & Local Economic Sanctions: The Constitutionality of New
York's Divestment Actions and the Sudan Accountability & Divestment Act of 2007, 74 ALB.
L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2010-2011).
203. Id.
204. Sapna Desai, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment Statutes,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 678 (2009) (citing 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 520 §§ 22.5-22.6 (West
2007)).
205. Id. at 679 (citing 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 § 1-110.5 (West 2007)).
206. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 733.
207. Id. at 737.
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First, the United States District Court of the Northern District of
Illinois struck down the amendment o the Moneys Act because fed-
eral law preempted it.208 The defendants argued that this amend-
ment was not preempted by federal law by citing to the Board of
Trustees v. Baltimore, which stated there is a strong presumption
against preemption in areas traditionally regulated by the states,
such as pension funds.209 The Giannoulias court found the defend-
ant's argument unpersuasive, however, because it concluded that
the court in Board of Trustees did not cite any authority that deter-
mined state laws are presumed not to be preempted by federal for-
eign affairs laws.210 Conversely, the Giannoulias court determined
that "when Congress legislates in an area of foreign relations, there
is a strong presumption that it intended to preempt the field." 211
The district court examined the difference between the Moneys Act
and federal policy and determined that federal law preempted the
amended Moneys Act because the "lack of flexibility, extended geo-
graphic reach, and impact on foreign entities interfere[d] with the
national government's conduct of foreign affairs."212
When the district court analyzed whether the Illinois Sudan Act
intruded on the federal government's authority to conduct foreign
affairs, it noted that there was minimal case law on the issue.213
The court reasoned that the act could influence multinational com-
panies to withdraw from Sudan, which would be "more than an 'in-
cidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."'2 14 Further, the Illi-
nois Sudan Act impacted the national government's ability to regu-
late Sudanese relations.215 Therefore, the district court concluded
that the amended Moneys Act would interfere with the federal gov-
ernment's ability to address the Sudanese government.216
After the district court found the amended Moneys Act unconsti-
tutional on the above-noted two grounds, it analyzed whether the
208. Id. at 741-42.
209. Id. at 740 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 741
(Ct. App. Md. 1989)).
210. Id. The court noted, since the federal government possesses such a strong interest
in regulating foreign affairs, it is not surprising that the defendants did not cite any such
authority. Id.
211. Id. (citing Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 76 (1st Cir. 1999)).
212. Id. at 741-42.
213. Id. at 742.
214. Id. (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
215. Id. The district court found that the Illinois Pension Code did not intrude upon the
federal government's authority to conduct affairs. Id. Although it found that this provision
merely barred state pension funds from investing in companies that did business with Sudan,
this provision could only have a "hypothetical impact on the national government's conduct
of foreign affairs." Id.
216. Id. at 745.
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part of the act that amended the Illinois Pension Code violated the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.2 1 7 The court opined that this
provision violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because
it burdened foreign commerce "by limiting the ability of banks and
corporations to conduct business with Sudan and entities tied to
Sudan."218 The defendants argued, however, that Illinois was act-
ing as a market participant; therefore, the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause does not apply.219 However, as mentioned above, it is
not conclusive that the market participant exception applies to for-
eign commerce.220 Nonetheless, this court opined that it did not
need to determine whether the market participant exception ap-
plied to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because Illinois was
not exclusively acting as a market participant.221 Since the amend-
ment to the Pension Code affected municipal pension funds, it was
acting as a market regulator.222 Without the protection of the mar-
ket participant exception, the court held that the Pension Code
amendment violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.223
Two weeks after the Giannoulias decision, Congress proposed the
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (the "SADA") to protect
state and local sanctions against Sudan from constitutional chal-
lenges.224 The SADA authorizes "State and local governments to
divest assets in companies that conduct business operation[s] in Su-
dan, [and] to prohibit United States Government contracts with
such companies[.]"2 2 5 The SADA resolves the constitutional issues
challenged in Giannoulias by authorizing such state sanctions.226
The legislation balances two essential interests - the federal gov-
ernment's authority to manage foreign policy and the "ability of
State and local governments to invest and divest their funds as they
see fit." 2 2 7 The SADA strikes "an appropriate balance by targeting
state action in such a way that permits state divestment measures
217. See Trachy, supra note 202, at 1032-33.
218. Id.
219. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 747 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
220. Id. at 748.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 749.
224. Trachy, supra note 202, at 1034.
225. Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat.
2516 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2007)).
226. Trachy, supra note 202, at 1036.
227. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 110-213, at 3 (2007)). The Tenth Amendment "may reserve to
the states the power to determine with whom an individual state may deal..." Id.; see U.S.
CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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based on risks to profitability, economic well-being, and reputa-
tions, arising from association with investments in a country sub-
ject to international sanctions."228 The SADA supports the actions
of state and local governments in regards to the sanctions against
Sudan and expressly states that the sanctions are not preempted
by federal law.2 2 9
Although President George W. Bush signed the SADA, he at-
tached a signing statement that cast doubt upon whether states
were actually allowed to enact sanctions.230 In his signing state-
ment, President Bush declared that the SADA "purports to author-
ize State and local governments to divest from companies doing
business in named sectors in Sudan and thus risks being inter-
preted as insulating from Federal oversight State and local divest-
ment actions that could interfere with implementation of national
foreign policy." 2 3 1 Further, he stressed that the Constitution grants
the exclusive authority to conduct foreign affairs to the federal gov-
ernment; therefore, he asserted, "the executive branch shall con-
strue and enforce this legislation in a manner that does not conflict
with that authority."232 Thus, while the SADA was enacted, the
question remains as to whether state sanctions enacted with Con-
gressional approval may still be unconstitutional because they in-
terfere with the federal government's authority to conduct foreign
affairs.233
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ANTI-BDS LEGISLATION
In order to analyze whether the state anti-BDS laws are uncon-
stitutional, the first step is to determine the specific purpose for
their enactment.234 This issue begs the question of whether the
state anti-BDS laws were enacted to affect the foreign affairs of the
nations or whether they were enacted to serve a legitimate local
purpose.235 Reaching a conclusion on this inquiry will either resolve
or greatly narrow the following constitutional analysis of the state
anti-BDS laws.23 6
228. S. REP. No. 110-213, at 3 (2007).
229. Id.
230. Trachy, supra note 202, at 1037.
231. Presidential Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of
2007, 43 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1646, 1646 (Dec. 31, 2007).
232. Id.
233. Trachy, supra note 202, at 1038.
234. See Fenton, supra note 13, at 571.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 573.
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On the surface, the anti-BDS laws are merely a form of selective
investment practices that divest money from companies that the
states do not morally agree with; however, deeper consideration
points to another purpose.237 The political and public interests in
creating the anti-BDS laws were to take a firm stand on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.238 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a delicate
situation that must be handled with care.239 For decades, the
United States has conducted foreign policy to help the Israelis and
the Palestinians reach an agreement over land.2 4 0 Allowing states
to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will likely hin-
der the United States from conducting diplomacy with the Israelis
and Palestinians.241 Thus, since the anti-BDS laws were enacted to
speak out against the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they likely
interfere with the federal government conducting diplomacy, state
anti-BDS laws are likely unconstitutional.242
A. Intrusion into Foreign Affairs Analysis
Conducting the nation's foreign affairs is a crucial matter. For
this reason, the Constitution and case law assign this responsibility
to the president and Congress, not to the states.243 Any state action
that interferes with the federal government's ability to conduct for-
eign affairs is forbidden.244 Since the state anti-BDS laws protect
and include the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the states are
promoting Israel's occupation of a territory that the Palestinian's
want for their own state.245 The West Bank causes controversy be-
cause Israel continues to build settlements in this territory.246 In-
cluding Israeli settlements in the state anti-BDS legislation may
compromise the president's ability to conduct diplomacy relating to
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over the West Bank.
237. See id. at 574.
238. See id.
239. See generally JillAllison Weiner, Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo Accords, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 230, 234 (1999). Israelis and Palestinians have been fighting since before Israel's
independence in 1948. Id.
240. See generally Oslo Accords, supra note 2.
241. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
242. See generally Fenton, supra note 13, at 574.
243. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-
64(1941). Primarily, the president is in control of conducting diplomacy with foreign nations.
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
244. Id. at 740 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746
(Ct. App. Md. 1989)).
245. See generally Perry & Mohyeldin, supra note 20.
246. Perry & Mohyeldin, supra note 20.
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State sanctions, such as the anti-BDS laws, are designed to affect
foreign nations, which would naturally affect the federal govern-
ment's ability to conduct diplomacy in that specific nation; however,
courts analyzing state sanctions are split on this issue.2 4 7 The Gian-
noulias court determined that state sanctions against Sudan would
hinder the federal government from dealing with the Sudanese gov-
ernment.2 48 Additionally, in Crosby, the Court ruled that state
sanctions against Burma prevented the president from conducting
diplomacy in Burma.2 49 Conversely, the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Board of Trustees of Employees'Retirement System v. Baltimore,
that analyzed local sanctions against South Africa, determined that
the state sanctions would have a minimal effect on foreign rela-
tions.250
The Maryland Court of Appeals seemingly overlooked the very
purpose of the sanction against South Africa - to change the be-
havior of the South African government.2 5 1 While the court ruled
that the sanctions against South Africa would only have a "minimal
and indirect" effect on South Africa, enacting local legislation on the
intricate matter of the South African apartheid regime very likely
hindered the federal government from conducting diplomacy.2 52
The local sanction against South Africa further complicated the al-
ready intense foreign conflict.2 5 3
Like the delicate foreign affairs issues present in the other sanc-
tion cases, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an issue best handled
by presidential diplomacy.254 Presidents have conducted diplomacy
over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for decades.2 5 5 Presidents have
been the mediators between the Israelis and Palestinians during
peace discussions over the years, working hand in hand with lead-
ers from both groups.2 5 6 Currently, the federal government's goal
is to help the Israelis and Palestinians reach an agreement on the
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, because many believe the set-
tlements are halting peace negotiations .257
247. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 747 (N.D.
Ill. 2007); Bd. of Trs. ofthe Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 748.
248. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
249. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000). While the SCOTUS
largely skirted the issue of the state's intrusion into foreign affairs, it still determined that
the sanctions against Burma hindered the president from conducting diplomacy. See id.
250. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 746.
251. See generally Fenton, supra note 13, at 574.
252. See generally id.
253. See generally id.
254. See generally Fisher, supra note 42.
255. Oslo Accords, supra note 2.
256. Id.
257. See generally Munoz, supra note 34.
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Notably, the states and President Obama seemed to hold oppos-
ing views on the Israeli settlements.258 In President Obama's sign-
ing statement to the Trade Act, he expressed his hesitation in
shielding the Israeli settlements from harm due to boycotts, while
the state anti-BDS laws include and support the Israeli settle-
ments.259 President Obama's reservation about including and pro-
tecting the Israeli settlements in the Trade Act was predicated on
the fact that it could prevent him from conducting diplomacy.260
President Obama's reservations about protecting Israeli settle-
ments is direct evidence that the states are likely not permitted to
take a stand on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by enacting anti-
BDS laws.2 6 1 During a land dispute of this nature, having the pres-
ident express his view on the settlements while the states express
the opposite view jeopardizes the Nation's foreign policy goals to
achieve peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. For this rea-
son, the state anti-BDS laws will likely impede the federal govern-
ment's authority to conduct its foreign relations over the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, thus violating the constitution.262
B. Violation of the Commerce Clause Analysis
Anti-BDS laws discriminate against any company, foreign or do-
mestic, that supports the BDS Movement by boycotting Israel,
which is a violation of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.263
Courts rarely uphold laws that violate the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause.264 The only way for the state anti-BDS laws to sur-
vive under a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis is to fall
within the market participant exception.265 The states with anti-
BDS laws would be considered market participants since they are
deciding whom to contract with and whom to invest in, rather than
working within their usual governmental capacity as market regu-
lators; however, the SCOTUS has never determined whether the
market participant exception applies to the dormant Foreign
258. Kampeas, supra note 75.
259. Id. While President Trump does not and likely will not enforce President Obama's
signing statement, President Obama's signing statement is evidence that the federal govern-
ment must be able to speak with one voice when it comes to a delicate situation such as
Israeli settlements. See DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
260. Kampeas, supra note 75.
261. See id.
262. See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 429 (1968).
263. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979).
264. See generally id.
265. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984).
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Commerce Clause, and lower courts provide limited authority on
the issue.266
The court in Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System
v. Baltimore, analyzing the sanction against South Africa, refer-
enced the fact that the SCOTUS had never applied the market par-
ticipant exception to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.267 In-
stead of being wary of this, the court determined that the local sanc-
tion would still be protected under the market participant excep-
tion.2 6 8 While the Giannoulias court recognized the harm that state
sanctions could have on diplomatic powers, it did not concretely de-
termine whether the market participant exception applied to the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.269
It is unlikely that the SCOTUS would rule that state sanctions
should be protected under the market participant exception since
state sanctions take a stand on fragile foreign conflicts.270 It is more
important for the Nation to speak with one voice on foreign affairs,
than to extend the market participant exception to the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause.271 Since the anti-BDS laws likely hin-
der the president from conducting foreign policy related to the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the SCOTUS
will extend the market participant exception to the states; there-
fore, the state anti-BDS laws are likely unconstitutional under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, currently.
While the anti-BDS laws are likely unconstitutional under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress' proposed "Combat-
ing BDS Act of 2017" could prevent that constitutional challenge.272
If passed, the proposed act would give the states expressed approval
from Congress to divest state funding from companies that boycott
Israel.2 7 3 While it is well established that Congress can authorize
266. Hutchens, supra note 132, at 446; see, e.g., Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating it is more important for the nation to speak with one
voice when conducting foreign affairs than to extend the market participant exception to the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523
F. Supp. 2d 731, 748 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (opining that it is "not a foregone conclusion" whether
the market participant exception applies to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Antilles
Cement Corp. v. Calderon, 288 F. Supp. 2d 187, 197 (D.P.R. 2003) (ruling that the market
participant exception does not apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Bd. of Trs.
of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 753 (Md. 1989) (applying the market
participant exception to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause in a state sanction case).
267. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 752.
268. Id. at 753.
269. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745, 748.
270. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 66; Antilles Cement Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
271. See id.




state action that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, the SCOTUS has never opined whether the federal govern-
ment can authorize state action that violates the dormant Foreign
Commerce clause.2 7 4 If the federal government can authorize state
action that would violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,
the next issue is which federal branch could give the states this per-
mission.2 75 Ultimately, it depends on what the state action is in-
truding on, either a presidential area of foreign relations, a congres-
sional area of foreign relations, or a shared area of foreign rela-
tions.276
On its face, the anti-BDS laws fall into the realm of affecting for-
eign commerce, since they are divesting from companies that par-
ticipate in the Israeli boycotts and are restricting pension fund dis-
tribution.2 7 7 In actuality, the anti-BDS laws were enacted to change
the behavior of the Palestinian-led BDS Movement and its support-
ers, which interferes with the president's diplomatic power over the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.2 7 8 Since the anti-BDS laws affect for-
eign commerce as well as the Nation's diplomacy, the anti-BDS laws
will likely need Congressional and presidential authorization to
survive.2 7 9 When signing the SADA, an act nearly identical to the
proposed Combating BDS Act of 2017, President Bush expressed
his hesitation that the act was unconstitutional, most likely be-
cause the act hindered him from conducting diplomacy.280 If Presi-
dent Bush's hesitation is any indication of the future of the proposed
Combating BDS Act of 2017, state anti-BDS laws may not receive
the authorization that they need to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.
274. Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level Foreign Policy: (Re) Justifying, Refin-
ing and Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 201,
283 (2011).
275. Id. at 284.
276. Id. at 284-85. In other words, if the state action is purely affecting commerce, Con-
gress should be able to authorize the state action. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. If the
state action is intruding on the president's diplomatic power, the president should be able to
authorize the state action. Schaefer, supra note 274, at 285; see U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
277. See Schaefer, supra note 274, at 286.
278. See id.
279. See id. The president can express his approval via signing the Combating BDS Act
of 2017, if it gets passed in both houses of Congress. See generally id.
280. See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat.
2516 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2007)); Presidential Statement on Signing the




C. Preemption by Existing Federal Law Analysis
Congress controls the extent to which the state anti-BDS laws
are preempted.281 Since Congress did not expressly preempt states
from sanctioning supporters of the BDS Movement, the primary is-
sues are whether Congress intended to occupy the field with the
Trade Act, or whether the state anti-BDS laws stand as an obstacle
to the federal government achieving its goal to put pressure on the
BDS Movement.282 In order to determine whether Congress in-
tended to preempt the anti-BDS laws, there is mixed authority.283
On one side, the court that analyzed the Baltimore sanctions
against South Africa would determine that the anti-BDS laws
would receive a strong presumption against preemption because
the anti-BDS laws are monitoring state investments, which is a tra-
ditional duty of the states.284 Further, that court determined that
there must be compelling evidence to show that Congress intended
to preempt the state sanction.285 The Giannoulias court that ana-
lyzed the Illinois sanction against Sudan, however, rejected that ar-
gument.286 Since Congress acted in an area of foreign relations
when it passed the Trade Act, the Illinois state court would opine
that there is a strong presumption that Congress intended to occupy
the field, thus preempting the state anti-BDS laws.2 8 7 Knowing
that preemption is disfavored, it is likely that the Giannoulias court
incorrectly determined that the state sanction against Sudan was
preempted by federal law.2 8 8 Rather, the Baltimore court correctly
determined that presumption is not lightly presumed in instances
similar to the state anti-BDS laws.2 8 9
One of the Trade Act's primary goals is to discourage companies
from boycotting Israel, which is the same goal as the state anti-BDS
281. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Garcia & Garvey, supra note 9, at 6.
282. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
283. See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 741 (Md. 1989)
(stating that in areas where states traditionally regulate, there is a "strong presumption
against finding federal preemption."); but see Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Gian-
noulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating "when Congress legislates in an
area of foreign relations, there is a strong presumption that it intended to preempt the field").
284. See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 741. The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals stated that monitoring state investments is clearly an area where states traditionally
regulate; therefore, the state sanction was not preempted. Id.
285. Id. (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
286. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Emps' Ret. Sys., 562
A.2d at 741).
287. Id.
288. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (stating
'preemption is not to be lightly presumed").
289. See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 741.
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laws.290 It is unlikely that a court will determine that Congress in-
tended to occupy the field against the BDS Movement because, if
anything, the states are helping Congress achieve its goal to dis-
suade economic warfare against Israel. The state anti-BDS laws do
not hinder the federal government's goal to prevent boycotts
against Israel; conversely, the anti-BDS laws promote the federal
government's goal.291 Thus, it is unlikely that Congress intended to
preempt the states from acting against the BDS Movement.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the state anti-BDS laws were created to stand by their ally,
Israel, the anti-BDS laws may cause more harm than good. Due to
the intricate nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is best to
allow the federal government, specifically the president, to speak
out on the conflict, rather than the states.292 The primary issue
with the state anti-BDS laws is the inclusion of the highly disputed
Israeli settlements in the West Bank.2 93 Since the Israeli settle-
ments are at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the states
should not speak out about this delicate issue. This inclusion may
harm the president's ability to conduct foreign policy with the Is-
raelis and Palestinians.294 Further, since the state anti-BDS laws
discriminate against foreign commerce, they also likely violate the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.295 However, it is unlikely that
the state anti-BDS laws are preempted by federal law, since the
anti-BDS laws support federal legislation sanctioning companies
that boycott Israel.2 9 6 Even still, the future of the state anti-BDS
laws and future state sanctions to come is unknown due to the lack
of authority from the SCOTUS. Since the states may very well af-
fect foreign affairs by establishing state sanctions, the SCOTUS
must determine once and for all whether states are permitted to
target foreign nations in the form of state sanctions.
290. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 205, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(b)(4) (West
2016).
291. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
292. See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (stating the presi-
dent is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations").
293. See generally Presidential Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Di-
vestment Act of 2007, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1646, 1646 (Dec. 31, 2007).
294. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 744 (citing Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968)).
295. See generally Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979).
296. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 205, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4452(c) (West
2016).
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